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It is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under-development in 
many parts of the world. Such states are incapable of delivering basic services to 
their citizens and political violence is commonplace. As of yet, mainstream 
development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and 
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for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety of development policies in 
different types of states. 
 
 
JEL Codes:  010, 019 and P45 
 
Keywords:  state fragility, development     
This series is published by the Economic Organisation and Public Policy Programme 
(EOPP) located within the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics 
and Related Disciplines (STICERD) at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science.  This new series is an amalgamation of the Development Economics 
Discussion Papers and the Political Economy and Public Policy Discussion Papers.  
The programme was established in October 1998 as a successor to the Development 
Economics Research Programme. The work of the programme is mainly in the fields 
of development economics, public economics and political economy. It is directed by 
Maitreesh Ghatak. Oriana Bandiera, Robin Burgess, and Andrea Prat serve as co-
directors, and associated faculty consist of Timothy Besley, Jean-Paul Faguet, Henrik 
Kleven, Valentino Larcinese, Gerard Padro i Miquel, Torsten Persson, Nicholas 
Stern, and Daniel M. Sturm.  Further details about the programme and its work can 
be viewed on our web site at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/research/eopp. 
 
Our Discussion Paper series is available to download at: 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=EOPP 
 
For any other information relating to this series please contact Leila Alberici on: 
 
Telephone:   UK+20 7955 6674 
Fax:    UK+20 7955 6951 





















© The authors. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two 
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, 
including © notice, is given to the source. 1 Introduction
The donor community has increasingly begun to confront the implications
for development policy of the prevalence of weak, fragile, and failing states
in some of the world￿ s poorest countries. And this has lead to a gradual shift
in focus towards the speci￿c problems that arise in such states (see, e.g.,
McGillivray, 2006). As a result, there is now an emerging policy literature
which worries about how to deal with such states and what can be done to
improve their situation (see, e.g., OECD, 2010a).
Speci￿c lists of fragile states have been produced by national aid agencies,
international organizations, and individual research teams.1 To illustrate,
consider the 2009 Polity IV classi￿cation of fragile states which is summarized
in Figure 1.2 In this ￿gure, countries are classi￿ed according to their decile in
the distribution of fragility. Countries with the greatest fragility are colored
in black while those with least fragility are in white. Intermediate deciles are
colored in shades of gray. According to this classi￿cation, the most fragile
states are found in Subsaharan Africa and South Asia.
The Polity IV project on which Figure 1 is based is admirably clear in
explaining its eight underlying criteria, which include factors such as security
e⁄ectiveness, political legitimacy, and economic e⁄ectiveness. These concepts
are all based on speci￿c empirical indicators that are aggregated in a trans-
parent way. Such indicators certainly create a basis for debate about which
factors shape state fragility. But the conceptual underpinning of the mea-
surement is far from clear, and sometimes appears to confuse symptoms and
causes. For example, low income is included as a component of state fragility.
But is poverty a product of state fragility or a cause? The same can be said
for the measures of violence or insecurity, which also ￿gure prominently in
the de￿nition.
Typically, development agencies are less clear about their basis for clas-
sifying a state as fragile. For example, USAID (2005) uses two criteria, each
of which is su¢ cient to have a state classi￿ed as fragile: vulnerability and
crisis. Vulnerability refers to those ￿states unable or unwilling to adequately
assure the provision of security and basic services to signi￿cant portions of
their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question.
1Looking at di⁄erent classi￿cations of fragility (however termed) leads to rather similar
rankings of states.
2Rice and Patrick (2008) give an overview of di⁄erent attempts to measure state weak-
ness or fragility.
2This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis.￿Crisis refers
to ￿states where the central government does not exert e⁄ective control over
its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital ser-
vices to signi￿cant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government
is weak or nonexistent, and where violent con￿ ict is a reality or a great risk.￿
As far as we can tell, these criteria are applied subjectively.
Notwithstanding the attention to fragile states by the policy commu-
nity, mainstream development economists have paid little attention to these
problems in spite of a resurgence of interest in the political economics of
development.
Our paper tries to take some steps in this direction by exploring the ori-
gins of state fragility and highlighting two main pathologies that need to be
explained: state ine⁄ectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting property,
providing public goods and raising revenues, and political violence either in
the form of repression or civil con￿ ict. We propose a theoretical framework,
in which the roots of these pathologies can be explored.3 In this framework,
a government is endowed with a level of ￿scal capacity (the ability to tax)
and a level of legal capacity (the ability to support markets). Policy decisions
include how much to spend on public goods and transfers. Political institu-
tions may constrain the distribution of transfers; stronger, more cohesive,
institutions prevent incumbents from using the state to make transfers solely
to the incumbent group. Governments can make three kinds of investments:
(i) in ￿scal capacity; (ii) in legal capacity, and (iii) in violence, the latter as a
means of holding on to power. Opposition groups can also invest in violence
if they choose to, and do so in order to acquire power.
Seen through the lens of our model, an ine⁄ective state is one which
has made few investments in ￿scal and legal capacity, and a violent state is
one where the government and opposition invest in violence to maintain or
acquire political power. A common interest in providing public goods, fos-
tered either by circumstances or cohesive political institutions, can eliminate
both of these problems. However, when institutions are non-cohesive either
pathology may emerge and the model allows us to explore the conditions for
their emergence, thus uncovering the roots of state fragility. Having an ex-
plicit theory enables us to clarify what is exogenous and what is endogenous.
3The paper builds on our earlier work, especially Besley and Persson (2009) and (2010).
Besley and Persson (2011) provide a full exploration of the ideas developed here, and a
discussion of microoeconomic and micropolitical foundations for the reduced-form relations
used in this paper.
3It also enables us to clarify what is a symptom and what is a cause ￿a very
murky distinction in the present policy debate.
The main output of our theoretical model is a matrix of parameter ranges,
de￿ning the roots of di⁄erent state pathologies. States that are peaceful and
have high levels of state capacity have common interests and/or cohesive
political institutions. In the absence of such commonalities, however, the
details really matter. Pathologies are identi￿ed with cases in which there is
either repression or civil war on the one hand, and a weak or redistributive
state on the other. On the basis of this observation, we suggest an Anna
Karenina Principle of state organization, paraphrasing the 1st line of Leo
Tolstoy￿ s 1870s novel):
￿All happy families resemble each other; every unhappy family is
unhappy in its own way.￿
In our case, common-interest states are the happy families with peace as well
as high state e⁄ectiveness. As in the Tolstoy quote, the unhappy families
come in many forms. This principle re￿ ects a real, practical di¢ culty in
dealing with fragile states, namely to understand the factors that are driving
the state in a particular direction.
Our theoretical framework helps to sharpen the policy discussion by high-
lighting how di⁄erent factors contribute to state fragility. The focus on frag-
ile states underlines a wider set of issues, which are crucial to discussions
about development policy. It is well understood that the problem of under-
development re￿ ects a complex array of interdependent factors which clus-
ter together, and where low income and living standards make up just one
dimension. The notion of a fragile state is useful in highlighting this multi-
dimensionality, and in getting away from excessive emphasis on income and
insu¢ cient emphasis on state ine⁄ectiveness and political violence.
Our analysis also serves to highlight some of the policy dilemmas as it
allows us to think about the consequences of development assistance. Specif-
ically, we use our model to analyze the e⁄ects of various forms of assistance in
various types of countries. This analysis takes into account the equilibrium
responses in the recipient country in terms of policymaking, state-capacity
investments and investments in violence and how these depend on the form
of intervention as well as any speci￿c pathologies with regard to state inef-
fectiveness or the propensity for political violence of di⁄erent types.
A large amount of aid is given by rich countries to nations in the devel-
oping world. O¢ cial Development Assistance (ODA) comes mainly from the
423 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). According
to the OECD, the total ￿gure in 2009 is around $123 billion (this ￿gure,
as others below, is in ￿xed 2008 prices), which is the highest number ever
recorded. While the amount of aid kept increasing in the post-war period, it
started falling immediately after the end of the cold war, but then picked up
again. In 2002 it surpassed its previous peak of $86 billion from 1992, and
has kept increasing since then. While aid targets for rich countries have been
set at 0.7% of Gross National Income, very few countries meet these targets
and, in fact, the trend is declining over time. The amount of aid from the
DAC countries today stands at about 0.31 of their total GDP, as opposed to
0.54 in 1961.
Out of the $120 billion of total ODA given in 2008, about 30% was given
indirectly through contributions to multilateral institutions like the Euro-
pean Union and the World Bank. About one sixth came in the form of
Technical Cooperation (plus additional indirect amounts through multilat-
eral institutions). On top of ODA, additional aid is given through the private
and institutional sector, with more than $20 billion channeled by NGOs. The
largest regional recipient of aid is Sub-Saharan Africa, which received 33% of
all ODA in 2007-2008, followed by 21% to Middle East-North Africa, about
15% each to South-Central Asia and the rest of Asia, 9% to Latin America,
and 4% to Europe.4
Exactly what can be done to improve the well-being of citizens in poor
nations remains a controversial topic.5 A shining example, which buoyed
interest and enthusiasm for aid, was the experience of the Marshall plan
for rebuilding post World War II Germany and other parts of Europe. Be-
tween 1948 and 1951, the U.S. transferred around $13 billion to European
economies. This episode created a sense that large-scale resource transfers
could make a signi￿cant di⁄erence to economic development, a sense that
was further underpinned by the so-called Truman Doctrine, which called for
a global focus on the plight of the developing world.
Arguably, the Marshall plan fuelled the belief that lack of resources is the
key impediment to economic development and aid ￿ ows are necessary to build
public institutions and stocks of capital. Countries may eventually achieve
a successful development path if left to themselves, but a helping hand of
4See OECD (2010b) for these background ￿gures. Gupta, Patillo, and Wagh (2006),
give an overview of trends in overall aid ￿ ows during 1960-2004.
5See Riddell (2007) for a review. Temple (2010) provides an excellent review of many
of the economic debates.
5international transfers would speed up that progress. Chenery and Strout
(1966) is a key exposition of the underlying ideas, and a modern statement
of a similar view is Sachs (2005).
The real-world experience has not ful￿lled the rather romantic vision of
early aid traditionalists. Aid pessimists point to the fact that much of aid
would not survive any reasonable cost-bene￿t test. Domestic political agendas
of governments in poor countries have frequently not supported economic
development, and these governments often lack the technical competence
to spend resources wisely. Because if this, it is argued, much aid is wasted
and does not contribute to developmental ends. Bauer (1972, 1975) was an
early aid pessimist, while a modern aid critique is strongly stated in Easterly
(2006).6
More recently, some observers have attempted to reconcile the two views,
by being more optimistic on conditionality and the ability of analysts to iden-
tify the underlying pathologies. Certainly, traditionalists have had a naive
view of the workings of political institutions or the ability to navigate around
political constraints. Without a more forthright analysis of the institutional
environment, it is hard to make progress. Collier (2007) can be seen as an
exponent of this revisionist view.
Our attempt in this paper to map out di⁄erent kinds of states and the
consequences of di⁄erent forms of development assistance can be seen as
an e⁄ort to elucidate such a revisionist view. Even though our exploration
is stylized and theoretical, the model gives a clear sense of the complexity
of the issues and policy dilemmas. The exact impact of aid will likely vary
with institutions as well as circumstances. Generalizations about the best
course of action are impossible given the heterogeneity in experience and the
limited empirical knowledge about several of the channels uncovered by our
theoretical analysis. This underlines the di¢ culties the donor community
has to grapple with when facing the problems of fragile states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
lay out a canonical two-period model with investments in state capacity
and political violence. Section 3 puts the model to work by investigating
the e⁄ects of di⁄erent forms of development policy ￿beginning with cash
transfers, but branching out to other forms like technical assistance and post-
con￿ ict assistance. In Section 4, we sketch some extensions of the analysis.
6Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008) argue that aid leads to a deterioration
in the quality of institutions.
6Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The modeling approach draws on our earlier work: Besley and Persson (2009,
2010, 2011).7 We develop a two-period approach to investments in state
capacity and violence.
2.1 Basic set-up
There are two time periods s = 1;2 with two groups of individuals, A and B;
each of which has comprises half the population. Every individual has wage
rate !(￿s) where ! (￿) is an increasing, concave function, and where ￿s is the
government￿ s legal capacity. There are no savings.
At the beginning of s = 1; one group holds power and we will refer to
this group as the incumbent I1 2 fA;Bg. The other group is the opposition
O1 2 fA;Bg: Between the two periods, there can be a transition of power.
This is a⁄ected by investments in political violence by the incumbent and
opposition. In period 1; the opposition group O1 can mount an insurgency
with army LO ￿ L
O
; paid for within the group, at marginal cost of funds ￿.
We interpret ￿ as a reduced form representation of how well-organized and
well-funded is the opposition. The incumbent group I1 can invest in army
LI ￿ L
I
; paid out of the public purse, at marginal cost ￿1. There is no
conscription: each soldier is just paid the period-1 wage, namely !(￿1).
The probability that the opposition takes over depends on the con￿ ict
technology ￿(LO;LI;￿) which is increasing in LO; and decreasing in LI. The
winner becomes next period￿ s incumbent, I2 2 fA;Bg and the loser becomes
the new opposition, O2 2 fA;Bg. If nobody takes up arms, then the tran-
sition probability is ￿(0;0;￿). The parameter ￿ is an index of the marginal
gain from ￿ghting ￿see Assumption 2 below.






s + ￿sgs ,
7Prior contributions related to the analysis in this paper include Acemoglu (2005),
Bates (2008), Caselli (2006), and Weingast (2005).
7where cJ
s denotes private consumption of a group-J member at s; and gs is the
consumption of public goods with ￿s denoting their value. One archetypal
example of gs is "defense", in which case ￿s is the "threat of external con￿ ict".





(1 ￿ ￿1)! (￿1) + rJ
1 ￿ ￿
J￿! (￿1)LO at s = 1
(1 ￿ ￿2)! (￿2) + rJ
2 at s = 2 .
where rJ
s is a transfer targeted towards group J and ￿
J = 1; if J = O; and
0 if J = I: The variable ￿s is ￿scal capacity, a costly investment made one
period ahead.8
The value of public goods stochastic. We assume a two-point distribution
￿s 2 f￿L;￿Hg; where ￿H > 2 > ￿L > 1; and Prob[￿s = ￿H] = ￿. Shocks
to ￿s are iid over time and we assume that the realization of ￿s is known
when policy is set. This captures uncertainty over the use state resources
in future which depends on the demand for common-interest public goods.
For example, the citizens may not know whether there will be a threat of
external war in the future.
The period-1 incumbent can invest in both legal and ￿scal capacity. We
take the initial stocks f￿1;￿1g as given and, for simplicity, assume that both
kinds of investment are irreversible. Fiscal and legal capacity can be aug-
mented by non-negative investments f￿2 ￿ ￿1;￿2 ￿ ￿1g. Investment in legal
capacity takes the form of courts, judges, credit and property registries. Such
investments are associated with a convex cost: L(￿2 ￿￿1); where L￿(0) = 0:
In the case of ￿scal capacity, the investment can be thought of as developing
a tax authority, its compliance structures and infrastructure to enforce an in-
come tax (or impose a value added tax). We posit a convex cost F(￿s￿￿s￿1)
of investing in ￿scal capacity with F￿(0) = 0:








F(￿2 ￿ ￿1) + L(￿2 ￿ ￿1) + ! (￿1)LI if s = 1
0 if s = 2
is the cost of investing in legal capacity, ￿scal capacity and violence in period
8In our earlier work, we work with constraints on the government￿ s tax and regulatory
policies: ts ￿ ￿s and pJ
s ￿ ￿s: Under the same assumptions as in this paper, we show
in Besley and Persson (2011) that it is always optimal for the incumbent to fully exploit
both legal and ￿scal capacity in every period. Thus, we skip that step here.
8s. The government budget constraint is9






where R is any additional revenue source accruing only to government in the
form of natural resource ownership and foreign aid. We will suppose that the
level of such resources is ￿xed and known ex ante.
Political institutions constrain the incumbent who must give a share ￿
(￿ 1) to the opposition group for any unit of transfers that it gives to its own
group. It is more convenient to work with the parameter ￿ = ￿
1+￿ 2 [0; 1
2]
to represent more ￿cohesive￿institutions. With ￿ close to 1=2, there is equal
sharing and ￿ close to zero represents a situation with weak constraints. A
higher value of ￿ corresponds to greater checks and balances on executive or
better representation of the opposition in government.
The timing of decisions in the model is as follows:
1. There is an initial level of state capacity f￿1;￿1g and an incumbent
group I1:
2. Nature determines the period-1 value of public goods: ￿1:
3. The incumbent chooses period-1 policies frI
1;rO
1 ;g1g and investments
in period-2 state capacities ￿2 and ￿2. Simultaneously, the incumbent




4. Period-1 consumption takes place.
5. The period-1 incumbent remains in power with probability 1￿￿(LO;LI;￿)
and nature determines the period-2 value of public goods: ￿2.
6. The period-2 incumbent chooses second-period policies frI
2;rO
2 ;g2g.
7. Period-2 consumption takes place.
9This formulation asssumes that ￿scal capacity is always fully exploited. In the un-
derlying research (Beslsy and Persson 2009, 2010, 2011), we allow the government to set
a tax rate on income, ts; under the constraint ts ￿ ￿s: There, we show that under the
assumptions of this paper, any incumbent does indeed exploit ￿scal capacity to the limit,
ful￿lling this constraint with equality.
9We look for a sub-game perfect equilibrium in policy, violence and state
capacity investments. Since the problem has a conveniently recursive struc-
ture, we are able to study these three parts separately beginning with policy
choices in each period. For the violence and state capacity investment deci-
sions, we work backwards with citizens forming rational expectations about
the period-2 policy outcome.
2.2 Policy






are made by the period s
incumbent and maximize:





s and the government budget constraint, (1). We need
to solve for two dimensions of policy: transfers and public-goods provision.





J[R + ￿s! (￿s) ￿ gs ￿ ms] ,
where ￿
I = 2(1￿ ￿) and ￿
O = 2￿. The revenue available for transfers is any
part not spent on public goods, gs or investments ms. Transfers are divided
between the two groups depending on the cohesiveness of institutions, as
measured by ￿. Since ￿
I ￿ ￿
O, the incumbent group will obtain a higher
level of transfers.
The optimal level of public-good provision is given by:
G(￿s;￿s) =
￿
Rs + ￿s! ￿ ms if ￿s ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)
0 otherwise .
All residual public revenues are spent on either transfers or public goods in
period s; depending on the realization of the value of public goods: ￿s. If
institutions are cohesive (￿ is close to one half), then all spending is on public
goods and none is on transfers.
Plugging in these optimal policies, we derive the following ￿indirect￿pay-
o⁄ function for group J in period s:
W(￿s;￿s;￿s;Rs;ms;￿
J) = ￿sG(￿s;￿s) + (1 ￿ ￿s)! (￿s) +
￿
J[R + ￿s! (￿s) ￿ G(￿s;￿s) ￿ ms] .
























for being the incumbent or opposition group in period 2 depending on the
state variables f￿2;￿2g. These are the expected value of arriving in period
2 with state capacities f￿2;￿2g either as a member of the incumbent or
opposition group.











for the incumbent group and
W(￿1;￿1;m1;￿













for the opposition group. For the opposition, we have deducted the cost of
violence: ￿! (￿1)LO; while, for the incumbent, violence is funded from the
public purse.
These payo⁄s are key to understanding the determinants of investments
in violence and state capacity. We begin by study the Nash equilibrium
between the incumbent and opposition group in their violence decisions.
2.3 Investments in political violence
The prospective trade-o⁄for the incumbent and opposition, as they contem-
plate investing in violence at stage 3, is to weigh a higher chance of period-2
political control against the cost of the investment.10 To study this as sim-
ply as possible, and to put some structure on the problem, we impose the
following restrictions on the con￿ ict technology:
10The structure of the con￿ ict model used here is a natural dynamic extension of the
set-up in Besley and Persson (2010).













￿O ￿ ￿IO ￿
￿O￿II
￿I .
Condition a just says that ￿ghting always has positive returns for both
groups, albeit at a decreasing rate. The property in b ensures that the
incumbent has a higher marginal return to ￿ghting, when both parties do
not invest in violence. It guarantees that the incumbent has a su¢ cient ad-
vantage in the returns to ￿ghting relative to the rebels. Finally, c restricts
the extent of any strategic complementarities or substitutabilities in the con-
￿ ict technology. Assumption 1 is satis￿ed by a number of reasonable, and
commonly used, contest functions.11










This says that ￿ indexes the advantage of the incumbent: raising ￿ increases
the incumbent￿ s marginal return to ￿ghting while reducing the opposition￿ s
marginal return to ￿ghting (in terms of each group￿ s probability of holding
power in period 2):
We now characterize the Nash equilibrium in violence levels denoted as n
^ LO; ^ LI
o






O (￿2;￿2) ￿ U
I (￿2;￿2)
￿
￿ ￿1! (￿1) ￿ 0 ,






I (￿2;￿2) ￿ U
O (￿2;￿2)
￿
￿ ￿! (￿1) ￿ 0 :
This way of writing the ￿rst-order conditions makes transparent that the
marginal bene￿t of investing in violence comes from the increased probability
of being the incumbent in period 2, while the cost is the resources that are
needed ￿nance this violence whether from public or private funds. For both
11See Dixit (1987) for an overview of contest functions.
12groups, the bene￿t is proportional to
￿
UO (￿2;￿2) ￿ UI (￿2;￿2)
￿
, the value of
being an incumbent in period 2. The parameter ￿1 is the opportunity cost
of public funds to the incumbent. A key observation for the result to follow,
is that: ￿
U
I (￿2;￿2) ￿ U
O (￿2;￿2)
￿
= ! (￿1)2(1 ￿ 2￿)Z ,
where
Z = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
R + ￿2! (￿2) ￿ G(￿L;￿2)
! (￿1)
￿
is the bene￿t from holding o¢ ce in terms of residual tax revenues relative
to the opportunity cost of ￿ghting determined by the period-1 wage. This
variable will determine the outcome in cases where common interests and
political institutions are weak.
We now use the two ￿rst-order conditions to characterize the Nash equi-
librium and its dependence on some key parameters. Our ￿rst result gives a
guaranteed condition for peace:
Proposition 1 If ￿L ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿) or ￿ is close to 1, neither group invests
in political violence, i.e. ^ LI = ^ LO = 0.
This proposition says that as long as institutions are su¢ ciently cohesive, or
there is a high enough demand for public goods, there is never any political
violence. In this case, the marginal bene￿t of being the incumbent goes to
zero as there is full agreement over policy. Since investing in violence is
costly, neither group chooses to invest anything.
We now explore what happens when these conditions do not hold.
Proposition 2 If Assumption 1 holds, ￿L < 2(1 ￿ ￿) and ￿ is below 1,








￿O (0;0;￿)(1 ￿ ￿)2(1 ￿ 2￿)
such that:
1. if Z ￿ ZI; there is peace with b LO = b LI = 0
2. if Z 2
￿
ZI;ZO￿
, there is repression with b LI > b LO = 0
133. if Z ￿ ZO; there is civil con￿ict with b LI; b LO > 0.
Moreover, b LO and b LI, whenever positive, increase in Z :
The proof is in the Appendix.
The proposition describes three states of violence. When Z is below ZI, no
con￿ ict erupts, as both incumbent and opposition accept the (probabilistic)
peaceful allocation of power, where the opposition takes over with probability
￿ (0;0;￿). When Z 2
￿
ZI;ZO￿
, the government invests in violence to increase
its survival probability, but the opposition does not invest in con￿ ict. It is
natural to label this case government repression. Finally, when Z > ZO, the
opposition mounts an insurgency, which is met with force by the incumbent
group, and we have civil war.
Our results have some striking empirical implications, when the logic of
political violence is expressed as a function of the latent variable Z: More
precisely, our theory predicts an ordering in Z of the three violence states:
peace, repression, and civil war:12 The existing literatures on political vi-
olence has studied repression and civil war as separate phenomena.13 Our
model provides a means of thinking about their common roots.
Four empirical corollaries to Proposition 2 are worth noting in the case
where political institutions are not cohesive and/or ￿ is far enough from one
so that political violence is a possibility, i.e. the case where Proposition 1 does
not apply. First, higher wages, !(￿1); reduce the likelihood that an economy
will experience either repression or civil war since an increase in the wage
increases the opportunity cost of ￿ghting. Second, higher natural resource
rents, or other exogenous forms of income such as aid increase the likelihood
that an economy will be in repression or civil war. Formally, this is because Z
is higher. Third, higher expected spending on common interest public goods,
due to higher ￿ decreases the likelihood that an economy will be in repression
or civil war. This is because Z is lower when this is the case. Fourth, political
institutions with more checks and balances (more minority representation)
leading to a higher value of ￿; decrease the likelihood of observing repression
or civil war.
12These are explored empircally in Besley and Persson (2010).
13Davenport (2007) reviews the literature on the former and Blatman and Miguel (2009)
the literature on the latter.
142.4 Equilibrium Political Turnover
We can now de￿ne the equilibrium rate of political turnover. Plugging in the















ZO(￿;￿;￿) ￿ Z > ZI(￿;￿1;￿)
￿ (0;0;￿) ZI(￿;￿1;￿) ￿ Z .
(4)
The turnover rate depends on which of the three cases in Proposition 2 is
relevant, since these determine the investments in political violence. While
it is clear that the probability of political replacement is lower in repression
than peace, the comparison of either peace or repression with civil war is
ambiguous.
We now draw out some comparative statics, which prove useful in our dis-
cussion of development policy and which link the rate of political replacement
to Z;￿ and ￿:
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the proba-
bility of political replacement varies with fZ;￿;￿g as follows:
1. An increase in Z reduces the probability of political replacement when
there is repression or civil war.
2. An increase in ￿ increases the probability of political replacement when
there is a civil war.
3. An increase in ￿ reduces the probability of political replacement when
there is repression or civil war.
The proof is in the Appendix.
This is an important result when it comes to studying the impact of vio-
lence on state-capacity investments since the likelihood that the incumbent
holds on to power a⁄ects these decisions when ￿ is low. The ￿rst part follows
from the fact that the incumbent ￿ghts relatively harder than the opposition
when more is at stake. This is because ￿I rises faster than ￿O by Assumption
1c. The second part of the proposition follows from the fact that it becomes
more costly for the opposition to use violence as ￿ goes up. This reduces
15turnover when there is a civil war, as the opposition ￿ghts less intensively. It
is also shifts up the threshold ZO where civil war breaks out. As for the third
part, the range of Z for which repression becomes wider as ￿ increases. This
is because, by Assumption 2, a higher value of ￿ cuts the incumbent￿ s trig-
ger point for violence and raises the opposition￿ s trigger point for violence.
Within the repression and civil war regimes, a higher value of ￿ makes the
incumbent invest more in violence while the opposition invests less. Hence,
it raises the probability that the incumbent group stays in power.
2.5 Investments in state capacity
To conclude the analysis of the equilibrium, we now consider investments
in state capacities f￿2;￿2g. These are determined simultaneously with the
violence decisions and maximize (2) taking LO as given.
Choosing f￿2;￿2g to maximize (2) yields the following Euler equations
for legal and ￿scal capacity:
!￿(￿2)[1 + (E(￿2;Z;￿;￿;￿) ￿ 1)￿2] 0 ￿1L￿ (￿2 ￿ ￿1) (5)
c.s. ￿2 ￿ ￿1 > 0
!(￿2)[E(￿2;Z;￿;￿;￿) ￿ 1] 0 ￿1F￿ (￿2 ￿ ￿1) (6)
c.s. ￿2 ￿ ￿1 > 0 ,
where
E(￿2;Z;￿;￿;￿) = ￿￿H + (1 ￿ ￿)E(￿2j￿L;Z;￿;￿;￿)
is the expected value of period-2 public funds with
E(￿2j￿L;Z;￿;￿;￿) =
￿
￿L if ￿L ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿)
2[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(Z;￿;￿)) + ￿￿(Z;￿;￿)] otherwise .
These conditions set the marginal bene￿t from investments in state capacity,
which depend on the expected marginal value of public funds. To understand
the latter, observe that if ￿L ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿), all spending is on the public good
regardless of the state. However, if ￿L < 2(1 ￿ ￿), then when ￿s = ￿L,
then the state spends on transfers. The expected value of those transfers
is 2[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(Z;￿;￿)) + ￿￿(Z;￿;￿)] which depends on the strength of
institutions, ￿, and the equilibrium rate of political survival (1￿￿(Z;￿;￿)).
16A lower probability of political replacement increases the value of public
funds.
Equations (5) and (6) both illustrate the importance of the future value
of public funds in determining investment incentives. For ￿scal capacity, this
is clear as it pays o⁄ in the form of an ability to raise more public funds in
period 2. But the value of public funds matters also for legal capacity, as it
carries an indirect bene￿t from investing through increased public revenues.
If E(￿2;Z;￿;￿;￿) > 1, then ￿scal and legal capacity are complements in the
sense that an increase in the stock of one kind of state capacity raises the
marginal return to investing in the other kind.
To pin down state capacities, we need two conditions. The ￿rst one is:
Cohesiveness ￿L ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿) .
This requires that ￿ be close enough to 1=2. Observe that, by Proposition 1,
the cohesiveness condition also guarantees that the equilibrium is peaceful.
The condition essentially guarantees that all government spending falls on
public goods whatever the realization of ￿s.
The second condition is:
Stability ￿￿H + (1 ￿ ￿)2[(1 ￿ ￿(Z;￿;￿))(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(Z;￿;￿)￿] ￿ 1.
This condition says that the expected value of public spending is above unity
(the value of private consumption) in a world where the cohesiveness con-
dition fails and hence spending falls on transfers when ￿2 = ￿L. Whether
this condition holds depends on the equilibrium level of political turnover.
This is because transfers are more valuable to the incumbent ex ante when
his group is more likely to retain o¢ ce, which is true when ￿(Z;￿;￿), the
probability of being replaced by the other group, is low.
We now show that the model implies three types of states, when it comes
to investing in state capacities.
The ￿rst possibility is a common interest state:
Proposition 4 If Cohesiveness holds or ￿ is close to one, there is a common-
interest state. Then,
1. there are investments in both kinds of state capacity
2. an increase in ￿ raises both ￿scal-capacity and legal-capacity invest-
ments, whereas changes in R;￿; or ￿ have no e⁄ects on investments.
17For this result to hold, it is su¢ cient that ￿ is close enough to one half, or ￿
has approached 1, so that all future marginal public revenues are allocated to
public goods. If so, the incumbent in period 1 is reassured that the state will
use public resources for common-interests, i.e., public goods regardless of who
is in power in period 2. Moreover, E(￿2;Z;￿;￿;￿)= ￿￿H +(1 ￿ ￿)￿L > 1 so
future public funds are valuable enough to make a positive marginal return to
investment in ￿scal capacity. A higher value of ￿ raises investments in both
aspects of that state by making future government revenue more valuable
and, given that state capacities are complements raises investment in both
￿scal and legal capacity. Finally, by Proposition 1, common-interest states
are always peaceful, since there is no redistribution to ￿ght about.
The second possibility is a redistributive state:
Proposition 5 If Cohesiveness fails but Stability holds, the state is redis-
tributive with public revenues used to ￿nance transfers when ￿s = ￿L. Then,
1. there are investments in both kinds of state capacity.
2. an increase in ￿ raises both ￿scal-capacity and legal-capacity invest-
ments, as do (weakly) higher values of R; ￿ or ￿:
In a redistributive state, the incumbent government uses available funds
to make transfers when ￿s = ￿L. It now chooses to invest in state capacity,
as it is su¢ ciently likely to stay in power and to have use of that capacity
as an incumbent. The stability condition implies that E(￿2;Z;￿;￿;￿) > 1
so that investment in ￿scal capacity and legal capacity are both worthwhile.
Moreover, both types of state capacity are complements.14 If the incumbent
￿nds itself under the risk of repression or civil war ￿i.e., Z is above one or
both of trigger points ZI and ZO ￿parameter changes that raise the intensity
of repression or civil war, and hence raise the chances that the incumbent
survives, promotes higher investments in both ￿scal and legal capacity. A
stronger redistributive state may thus go hand in hand with more repression.
Finally, we have the possibility of a weak state:
Proposition 6 If both Cohesiveness and Stability conditions fail, the state
is weak. Then, there is no incentive at all to invest in ￿scal capacity and the
14This complementarity is reinforced by the fact that higher state capacity of either
kind increases Z and hence (by Proposition 3) reduces the probability of being replaced
in o¢ ce.
18level of legal-capacity investment is lower than with a common interest or
redistributive state, all else equal.
The fact that the stability condition fails now implies that the mar-
ginal bene￿t of investing in ￿scal capacity is negative, E(￿2;Z;￿;￿;￿) < 1.
The non-cohesiveness of political institutions and the high rate of political
turnover means that any ￿scal capacity investments are likely to be used by
the other group for redistributive purposes once it takes o¢ ce. This deters
investment in the state and we see a weak state together with high politi-
cal instability associated with political violence. Legal capacity investment
is lower, because there is longer a positive bene￿t from raising wages coming
through the government budget constraint.
2.6 The State Space
Based on the results in this section, we can discuss the causes and con-
sequences of state fragility. Our model shows clearly how the two main
pathologies of states, political violence and low state capacity, have common
roots. It ties these pathologies together, particularly through parameters ￿
and ￿. High ￿; re￿ ecting cohesive political institutions, and high ￿; re￿ ecting
strong common interests, lead to high investments in ￿scal and legal capacity,
as well as low violence. This is the case of a peaceful and prosperous state ￿
the happy families in our quote from Anna Karenina in the introduction.
But if ￿ and ￿ are low, the details of the state pathologies matter, leaving
open the possibility of low investments in ￿scal and legal capacity, as well
as repression or con￿ ict ￿these are the unhappy families which are unhappy
in their own way. Speci￿cally, parameters a⁄ecting con￿ ict (R;￿;￿) become
relevant to the outcome.
The results are summarized in Table 1. Whether repression is associated
with a weak or redistributive state depends on equilibrium political stability.
When ￿ghting is costly (high ￿) and the advantage of the incumbent is large
(high ￿), we expect a redistributive state and repression to go together. This
is the case of an e⁄ective state in repression terms, which holds an incumbent
in power despite weak political institutions.
Civil war is generally associated with weak or redistributive regimes.
Weak states and civil wars arise under circumstances in which an insurgency
is relatively easy to organize (low ￿) and the government is not e⁄ective in
responding to it if it happens (low ￿). An increase in military e⁄ectiveness
19reduces the prospect of turnover and increases incentives to invest as in a
redistributive state. Another decisive factor for which particular pathology
we will observe is the amount of resource rents or foreign (cash) aid. For ex-
ample, a higher degree of resource dependence (high R) raises the likelihood
that we see civil war rather than repression.
The approach taken here implies that the fundamental determinants of
fragile states are the strength of common interests, the extent of cohesive
institutions, the amount of resource rents, and the technologies for organizing
and conducting violence. Phenomena like civil war, repression, low income
per capita, low spending on common-interest goods, low taxation and weak
enforcement of property rights are all symptoms rather than determinants.
Most of the existing literature on fragile states is not derived from any
underlying theory, which explains why it tends to mix up symptoms and
determinants. For example, one criterion that is frequently used in fragile
state indices is low income per capita. While it is true that this may increase
incentives for violence, all else equal, it is only an intermediate factor.15
An advantage of putting together a speci￿c dynamic theoretical struc-
ture ￿however simple ￿is that we get a clear sense of the margins where
we may see an equilibrium response, when an outside donor intervenes in
fragile states. In the next section, we thus use our framework to explore
the consequences of state fragility for development policy. We will ￿nd that
common-interest and peaceful states make the task of supporting develop-
ment quite easy. However, once we leave this fortunate state of a⁄airs, the
details of the pathologies matter.
3 Development Assistance
As Table 1 illustrates, a state away from the top right-hand corner, may
have a variety of potential symptoms and these have a variety of causes.
Moreover, the problems may change in response to shocks (such as hikes in
resource prices or natural disasters). E⁄ective development assistance has to
tailor the right form of intervention to circumstance and institutional context.
This opens up the menu of possibilities to include the right mix of budgetary,
project, military and technical assistance, and to make the right amount of
conditionality credible.
15This argument is reinforced further by introducing private capital formation as in
Besley and Persson (2011, Chapter 5).
20In our analysis, we assume that the primary objective of the international
community is the ex ante welfare of the citizens of a country to which it is pro-
viding development assistance. This neglects the role of strategic objectives,
which could explain the willingness of countries to donate.16 We also as-
sume away coordination problems, by analyzing a single intervention, rather
the plethora of sometimes uncoordinated action that characterizes the aid
industry. Our perspective thus supposes that a foreign government or mul-
tilateral organization makes a transfer of resources to a developing country.
The question is how this a⁄ects the behavior of the receiving government
and, ultimately, the welfare of the citizens.







. Does development assistance increase or de-
crease spending on public goods or the amount of redistributive transfers?
Second, the state capacity dimension: (￿s;￿s). In which way do di⁄erent
forms of development assistance in￿ uence the incentive to build ￿scal or le-




development assistance a⁄ects incentives of both the incumbent and opposi-
tion to use violence as a means of winning or securing power?
3.1 Cash Aid
We will proceed by applying a cost-bene￿t style analysis to the model. Sup-
pose that an aid agency is considering spending some aid resources in a
particular country at date s. Let the shadow price of this aid in the donor
country be ^ ￿. Depending on circumstances and institutions, the additional
resources will raise public-goods spending, state-capacity investments, trans-
fers (or, in a more general model, lower taxation). We will model cash aid
as an increase in the recipient government￿ s budget which we denote by ￿R.
This acts like an increase in Z in the model above.
The timing of the model is exactly as in Section 3, except that in between
stages 2 and 3 the aid agency commits resources ￿R for future aid that will
augment the period-2 budget. In deciding whether to o⁄er aid, we assume
that the aid agency can see through the subsequent equilibrium choices by
government thus correctly anticipating the recipient country￿ s responses. In
e⁄ect, the aid agency is applying backwards induction to the subsequent
moves in the policy and investment game.
16See the discussion in OECD (2010).
21We begin with the following benchmark result:
Proposition 7 In a common-interest state, cash aid is worthwhile if and
only if ￿￿H + (1 ￿ ￿)￿L > ^ ￿.
The logic of this result is clear. If 2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿L, all future spending is
devoted to public-goods regardless of the realization of ￿2. There is also
no con￿ ict risk in this case (as showed in Proposition 1). In ex ante terms,
therefore ￿R will be spent on public goods, with value ￿￿H + (1 ￿ ￿)￿L.
This is compared to the cost of ^ ￿.
In this case, observe that it would not make any di⁄erence whether devel-
opment assistance comes as budgetary aid or as direct support of a speci￿c
project. There is a complete congruence of interest between the aid donor
and the recipient government.
Suppose instead that the cohesiveness condition fails, but there is no
propensity to political violence. When ￿2 = ￿L, the additional resources are
spent on transfers rather than public goods. In this case, Proposition 7 is
modi￿ed to:
Proposition 8 In a weak or redistributive, but peaceful, state, cash aid is
worthwhile if and only if ￿￿H + (1 ￿ ￿) > ^ ￿.
In this case, the value of aid is lower than in the benchmark case of Propo-
sition 7 and aid does not yield a gross return above unity ￿the marginal
utility of consumption ￿as the probability of a high value of public goods
￿ ! 0:17 This result chimes with the frequently made observation, discussed
in Collier and Dollar (2004), that aid impact is better when institutions are
stronger.
Propositions 7 and 8 allow us to re￿ ect upon an observation made by
Peter Bauer, which Temple (2010) has christened the Bauer Paradox. His
view is succinctly stated in the following quote:
￿A government unable to identify ... projects or collect taxes is
unable to be able to use aid productively￿(Bauer (1975), page
400).
17In the benchmark model, granting cash aid in a common interest state makes no
di⁄erence to investments in state capacity. But this is due to the assumption that utility
is linear in public goods. In the case where V (g) is increasing and concave, this property
of the model is no longer true, and the analysis captures some aspects of the more sceptical
view on aid and its impact. This is explored in Besley and Persson (2011, Chapter 6).
22Being able to identify projects is like having high ￿H and/or high ￿.
Governments that are able to collect taxes (have high ￿scal capacity) will
likely have more consensual institutions (Proposition 4). Hence, these are
the governments where Proposition 7 applies. But when ￿ is low and ￿ is
low, aid is less likely to be used productively and the government is less
likely to build ￿scal capacity.
We now consider what happens in the case where the cohesiveness condi-
tion does not hold and where ￿ is low enough or R high enough, so that the
state is prone to political violence. This gives two additional considerations
in the comparative statics assessing the e⁄ect of cash aid on welfare. First,
there is an impact on the use of political violence, and second there is an ef-
fect, working through political stability, on investments in state capacities.
The e⁄ect of cash aid is like an increase in Z; which ￿as we know, from
Proposition 3 ￿raises the use of violence. This has two welfare e⁄ects. First,
it leads to more resources being allocated to violence, an activity which
is directly unproductive and has no direct welfare bene￿ts. Second, when
deciding on violence, each group does not internalize this e⁄ect on the welfare
of the other group, leading to strategic ine¢ ciency. We summarize this as:
Proposition 9 In a weak or redistributive state, which is prone to political
violence, a small increase in cash aid is welfare improving if ￿￿H +(1 ￿ ￿)￿
! (￿1) dL







dZ + ￿ dLO
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i
if Z > ZO(￿;￿;￿)
￿1
dLI
dZ if ZO(￿;￿;￿) ￿ Z > ZI(￿;￿1;￿):
With ￿2 = ￿H, we have a common-interest state and resources are spent
on public goods. When ￿2 = ￿L, resources are spent on transfers. The key
point is now that aid will have an impact on equilibrium violence re￿ ected
in the third term deducted from the value of any public goods that are being
created. Compared to Proposition 8, therefore, it is less likely that cash aid
is welfare increasing due to the additional welfare cost of violence. Indeed,
cash aid could actually lower ex ante welfare. This is more likely when ￿ is
low.
The enhanced violence a⁄ects political stability in line with the results in
Proposition 3.
Proposition 10 In a weak or redistributive state, which is prone to political
violence, cash aid can increase political stability and may increase investment
in ￿scal and legal capacity.
23This e⁄ect comes through the fact that foreign aid (by Proposition 3) allows
incumbents to entrench themselves and cement their control on power, when
institutions are non-cohesive. The most clear-cut example is the case of a
repressive regime. Once aid is given, the incentive to hang on to power is
enhanced. As we have seen, in Proposition 5, greater repression induces
more political stability, which results in more state-capacity investment all
else equal. But the bene￿ts are allocated in part to increased military force
and accrue disproportionately to the incumbent group.
3.2 Conditionality
The assumption in the previous subsection is that government cannot con-
tract directly over the policy and investment decisions when it grants aid.
Conditionality should be thought of as a contracting problem where the donor
government speci￿es an array of observable and veri￿able decisions by the
recipient government in exchange for ￿R. As with any interesting contract-
ing problem, the real issue is what can reasonably supposed to be observed
and enforced. The latter is a particular issue, given that there is nothing
equivalent to an international court which can enforce agreements. Indeed,
this is often thought of as a major obstacle to e⁄ective conditionality.18
It is interesting to see how the earlier results might be a⁄ected by (en-
forceable) conditionality. Propositions 8 and 9 highlight the possibility that
conditionality to make sure that aid is spent on public goods could be valu-
able. In the case of Proposition 9, it would ensure that fewer resources are
spent on violence. However, for this latter e⁄ect, it would have to be the case
that conditionality is binding on both the incumbent and the opposition if
the latter wins o¢ ce in the struggle for power.
But these prospective bene￿ts require that conditionality could be credi-
bly enforced. An interesting agenda for future research would be to combine
aspects of our framework with explicit modeling of mechanisms that might
help achieve credible enforcement, as in Svensson (2003). External players
potentially have several prospective instruments, whereby they can give a
future prize in return for present and continued good behavior. This could
include membership in or association with desirable clubs like EU (some-
thing used by EU to in￿ uence political and economic reform in Turkey and
18See Svensson (2000, 2003) for early analyses of the credibility problems wih condition-
ality.
24earlier in Eastern Europe). Another possibility might involve debt conces-
sions (or free-trade agreements) like the ones currently negotiated by EU
with Pakistan and with some African countries, and by the US with several
Latin-American countries.
3.3 Non-Cash Development Assistance
In this section, we consider the possibility of development assistance in other
forms than cash aid, as captured by in￿ uence on other parameters of the
model.
Technical Assistance Technical assistance refers to the transfers of skills
and knowledge that can be useful in improving how government works. Es-
timates from the OECD (2010b) suggest at least one sixth of direct o¢ cial
aid in 2008 is given in this form. Some people refer to technical assistance
as phantom aid, since it is often dispersed via international consultants who
reside in the donor country. Evaluating the returns to technical assistance is
notoriously di¢ cult, and is likely to be speci￿c to the context and the na-
ture of the intervention in question. Technical assistance can come in many
forms. Our model suggests a focus on two of these: (i) e⁄orts to increase
the bene￿ts or reduce the costs of providing public goods, and (ii) e⁄orts to
lower the cost of investing in state capacity. We will discuss these two cases
here and demonstrate how their impact can be thought of in our analytical
framework.
Consider ￿rst technical assistance that helps to identify good projects.
This can be represented in the model as an attempt to raise ￿ or ￿. An
important line of development research in recent years has used randomized
control trials (RCTs) to identify the value of public interventions.19 These can
be thought of as trying to ￿nd ways of better allocating resources to public
goods by identifying high bene￿t interventions. Such interventions also raise
the investments in state capacity (by Propositions 4 and 5). For given ￿,
it also makes it less likely that there will be con￿ ict (by Proposition 2) and
increases the probability of creating a common-interest state. We record this
as:
Proposition 11 Technical assistance that raises ￿H or ￿, increases welfare
19See Du￿ o et al (2007) for a discussion of these methods.
25and investment in state capacity. It also reduces the likelihood of political
violence.
Technical assistance can also be aimed towards increasing ￿L: In our frame-
work this could even lead to the creation of a common-interest state with its
virtuous consequences. In the case describe here, the cost of the intervention
should be weighed against the increased public goods that will be provided
(since ￿scal and legal capacity increase) and the value of the extra public
goods that are generated by these investments.
Our model shows the same complementarity between the value of aid and
cohesive institutions that we saw in the case of cash aid. Technical assistance
is more powerful in countries where public resources are more likely to be
allocated for the common good. So, the return to RCTs will be lower in weak
or redistributive states if they are intended to inform government about the
value of good policy.
While these observations are useful, they sweep a host of important prob-
lems under the rug. First, there is a scaling-up issue. Can the conditions in
small controlled trials really be replicated when they are implemented in a
large program by the government? This question is particularly acute since
many RCTs are implemented directly by NGOs, with limited contact with
the recipient government. Second, in assuming that the government budget
will be spent either on public goods or transfers, depending on the value of ￿;
we have not considered any issues of corruption or predation run by a small
elite (see Section 4).
Another type of technical assistance would be to reduce investment costs ￿
improving state capabilities. These interventions are common in development
and can be represented in the model as shifts in the functions F (￿) and L(￿).
In this case, we have:
Proposition 12 Technical assistance that reduces the cost of investing in
state capacity, i.e. reduces F (￿) and L(￿), increases welfare and investment
in state capacity. This tends to increase the likelihood of political violence, all
else equal.
The result on state capacity follows from the Euler equations (5) and (6).
Our framework makes sense of these type of interventions. Examples in-
clude giving advice on tax collection, or the creation of specialized courts
to expedite the resolution of business disputes. It could even mean advice
26about fundamental changes in the nature of the legal code. The (perhaps
surprising) e⁄ect on political violence comes from the fact that Z goes up
when state-capacity investments increase which, all else equal, may lead to
an increase in political violence
Military assistance We now consider the role of military assistance within
the con￿nes of our simple model. One aspect of such assistance may be to
give advice on military technology/strategy, which can be modeled as changes
in ￿. This could be training or provision of weapon systems and intelligence.
In principle, this could be o⁄ered either to the government or the opposition.
External governments could also directly intervene by providing manpower
to either the government or rebels. We focus on the case, where support is
o⁄ered to the incumbent government.
Our core result is:
Proposition 13 Military assistance that increases ￿; augmenting the mili-
tary capacity of the incumbent government, increases the parameter range in
which there is repression. This increases political stability and investment in
￿scal and legal capacity.
If institutions are weak, the higher political stability due to higher repressions
raise state capacity investments (by Propositions 3 and 5). But this comes
at the price of increasing the entrenchment of the incumbent. In e⁄ect, this
can create a rentier state, where the opposition group is frozen out of power.
Military intervention to help any incumbent will therefore tend to increase
the incentives for the incumbent to invest. But it is not a substitute for
more consensual institutions (higher ￿). This story seems relevant, perhaps
especially for the cold war, but also for modern-day fragile states with ongoing
or latent con￿ ict.
Post-con￿ ict assistance Finally, we consider attempts by external actors
to assist in the process of promoting peace in post-con￿ ict situations. Our
model allows us to represent this in a very stylized fashion.
Peace-keeping or disarming the rebels can be thought of as raising ￿:
This reduces the parameter range in which there is con￿ ict and increases
political stability (by Proposition 3). Many post-con￿ ict settlements can
27also be thought of as e⁄orts to raise ￿ (diminishing the gain to the winner).20
This will reduce the risk of violence (by Propositions 1 and 2). However, the
latter e⁄ect requires that the interventions are expected and hence credible
ex ante. A recent example of such a mechanism was attempted in Haiti
after the recent earthquake, where the high in￿ ux of aid has been disbursed
outside of the government structures with former U.S. President Bill Clinton
playing a key role. We summarize this in:
Proposition 14 Post-con￿ict assistance that raises ￿ or ￿ will lead to
greater investments in state capacities and reduce the parameter range in
which there is violence.
Of course, post-con￿ ict reconstruction may have a wider remit part of which
could involve direct e⁄orts to increase ￿ and ￿. However, post-con￿ ict assis-
tance generally comes with a good deal of cash aid, making reforms to raise
￿ and lower ￿ doubly important.
A related question is if we can think about a window of opportunity in
weak or collapsed states. Can external players assist in designing a politi-
cal mechanism and/or institutions capable of changing the internal political
equilibria in countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia? Historical
experience cautions us that a simple export or duplication of existing in-
stitutions need not work in many cases. Thus, almost all Latin American
states modeled their constitutions on the US one in the 19th century, but
with very di⁄erent results. The commonwealth countries of India and Pak-
istan started o⁄ with the same constitutional framework, provided by the
1935 Government of India Act, but with very di⁄erent outcomes.
Changing political mechanisms and institutions would be like changing ￿
and thereby potentially altering the type of state. To discuss this possibility,
we need to think carefully about the domestic incentives for undertaking
endogenous political reform. Such an extension of our analysis is brie￿ y
discussed in the next section.
20It may also be the case that there are measures to increase ￿ which ￿t better under
technical assistance ￿e.g., to improve the monitoring of public resource use making it
more transparent which group is bene￿tting from transfers.
284 Extensions
The structure we have proposed in this paper is simple and stylized and the
analysis can be extended in many directions. We now brie￿ y sketch ￿ve
possibilities.
Donor preferences for distribution In Propositions 7 and 8, the ex ante
value of a dollar of transfers is always greater than one; the worst that can
happen is that aid ends up as higher private consumption. The donor country
could however, care about the distribution of such transfers. This will tend
to reduce the value of transfers, to the extent that the donor is egalitarian
and ￿ < 1=2. To illustrate this point, suppose that the donor has a maximin
preference over distribution between the two groups. Then cash aid is worth
only 2￿ (< 1) when ￿s = ￿L in the non-cohesive case of Proposition 8. Then
aid is worthwhile only if ￿￿H + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿ > ^ ￿ and the left-hand side could
now be smaller than one.
Quasi-linear preferences We have worked with the stylized case where
utility is linear in public goods. Suppose instead that preferences are ￿sV (gs)+
xJ
s where V (￿) is increasing and concave ￿as we mentioned as a possibility
in Footnote 16 above. As shown in Besley and Persson (2011, Chapter 6)
budgetary aid now directly depresses the demand for ￿scal capacity since the
marginal value of public goods is lower (for any given level of ￿scal capac-
ity). Aid will also have a smaller e⁄ect on public goods to the extent that it
crowds out domestically generated ￿scal capacity. Both of these e⁄ects lower
the impact of aid on public-good provision.
Predatory states Our model does have redistribution across groups, but
assumes that the government faithfully represents the interests of the entire
incumbent group. But a feature of many countries in weak states is that
political elites are able to capture the state and to bene￿t disproportion-
ately from state transfers. Such conditions are often referred to as predatory
states.21 A very simple way to think about a predatory state in our frame-
work is to suppose that only a fraction (1 ￿ {) of the resources available for
21This is often more than just elite control but also refers to the kind of ine¢ cient
predatory practices that elites use to extract resources as discussed in Besley and Persson
(2011, Chapters 3, 5 and 7).
29transfers go to broad based transfers across the groups to which the cohe-
siveness parameter, ￿; applies. The remaining fraction, {; is captured by an
incumbent elite of size eI < 1. Then the payo⁄to a member of the incumbent
elite payo⁄ is:
￿sgs + (1 ￿ ￿s)! (￿s) +
h




[R + ￿s! (￿s) ￿ gs ￿ ms] :
If { > 0, this change in the model will a⁄ect both policy and investment
incentives. For public goods to be provided, we now require that
￿s ￿ (1 ￿ {)2(1 ￿ ￿) + {=e
I
as the equivalent of the cohesiveness condition. Since eI < 1, this is more
stringent than the cohesiveness condition stated above and this condition
may fail even if ￿s = ￿H and ￿ = 1=2. Thus, it is more likely that R goes
into transfers than in the baseline model. Moreover, these transfers could
mainly be funneled to elites, depending on the value of {. Both of these
e⁄ects make the prize from capturing the state greater, and this tends to
intensify the incentives for political violence if we assume that violence is
indeed organized by elites.
Endogenous political institutions We have taken ￿ to be exogenous.
But one critique of aid is that it leads to a deterioration in institutional
quality. The model can be extended to capture this by supposing that the
incumbent can also make decisions in period one that a⁄ects ￿2. As Besley
and Persson (2011, Chapter 7) discuss in detail, there will be a tendency
towards picking a lower ￿2 when ￿ is low. To the extent that an increase
in R reduces ￿, as we predict it would in Proposition 3, larger ￿ ows of cash
aid will lead to worse institutions. The key to cohesive institutions then
lies in understanding which factors might limit the ability of states to lower
￿ and/or ￿; rather than in these parameters per se. According to the logic
of our model, this is an important area where more work is needed, given
the importance of cohesive institutions in reducing political violence and
promoting state-capacity investments.
Private accumulation The only engine of growth in our model is higher
levels of legal capacity. This is, of course, an abstraction to focus on a speci￿c
mechanism working through investments in the state and their consequences.
30The model can also be extended to include ￿standard￿dynamic incentives to
increase income per capita such as the accumulation of capital. The analysis
in Besley and Persson (2011, Chapters 3 and 5) suggests that the pathologies
of the state that we have identi￿ed here will generally spill over into weaker
incentives for individuals to invest, further compounding the consequences of
state fragility and reducing incomes. This will amplify the link between low
incomes and state fragility.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a framework that makes sense of current policy debates
about impediments to development in fragile states. While attempts to de￿ne
state fragility precisely are open to interpretation, they are crucial in remind-
ing us that political violence and ine⁄ective states are commonplace in many
low-income countries. Our analysis shows how such situations can be under-
stood and highlights some features of the economic environment which may
perpetuate the problem. Table 1 summarizes our insights and underlines the
common roots of state pathologies. In broad terms, the deepest root is the
absence of common interests reinforced by non-cohesive institutions. Having
understood this, the question of what determines the cohesiveness of institu-
tions and whether this can be changed becomes of ￿rst-order importance.
It is important to acknowledge that this paper is a purely theoretical
exercise. In general, we know precious little about the empirical importance
of the channels identi￿ed by our theory, and even less about their importance
in the speci￿c states plagued by the pathologies highlighted in the paper.
Better knowledge can only be acquired with appropriate empirical analysis
on a case-by-case basis.
Our Anna Karenina Principle underlines the importance of heterogeneity.
This heterogeneity may, to some degree, reconcile the di⁄erent positions in
the debate on development policy which we discussed in the introduction.
Our model suggests, along with aid optimists, that there is the possibility
of advantageous development assistance. But identifying the form that this
will take requires a great deal of knowledge about country circumstances
and institutions. One could thus be an aid pessimist or an aid optimist,
depending on the form of aid and an assessment of the ability of aid agencies
to understand its impact in speci￿c contexts.
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346 Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2. The complementary slackness conditions for the






















where x = (1 ￿ 2￿)2(1 ￿ ￿) 2 [0;2].
First, we show that, at any interior solution, resources devoted to ￿ghting
by both groups is increasing in Z. To see this, observe that di⁄erentiating



























x2Z [￿II￿O ￿ ￿I￿IO]
￿
> 0 .
where we have used both parts of Assumption 1d.





xZ ￿ ￿1 7 0
c.s. ￿ L
I ￿ ^ L(Z) ￿ 0 .
It is simple to check that this is an increasing function of Z under Assumption














O(￿;￿) = ￿ :
The expression for dLO
dZ implies that for Z ￿ ZO, we must have LO > 0.
As the next step, we prove that ZO(￿;￿) > ZI(￿;￿). Suppose not, then
￿O (0;0;￿)xZ





















which contradicts Assumption 1c for all values of ￿.
Finally, it is easy to see from the explicit de￿nition that ZI(￿;￿) is an in-





is (weakly) increasing, it follows that this function is increasing
as well. This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. Part 1 is proved as follows. First, suppose that
there is repression then the result follows since Assumption 1 implies that
the incumbents payo⁄ is concave in LI and Z increases the marginal bene￿t
to ￿ghting. Now suppose that there is civil war. Di⁄erentiating (4) with
respect to Z yields:
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where we have used the comparative static result in (7) and Assumption 1c.
To prove part 2, observe that under repression, there is no e⁄ect on ^ LI
from changing ￿ since LO = 0. Now observe that with civil war, then as ￿























2(1 ￿ 2￿)Z2 < 0
by Assumption 1c.
Now we turn to part 3. First, suppose that there is repression then
the result follows since Assumption 1 implies that the incumbents payo⁄ is
concave in LI and ￿ increases the marginal bene￿t to ￿ghting. Now suppose



















where, as above, x = (1 ￿ 2￿)2. Di⁄erentiating (4) with respect to ￿ and














using Assumption 1c and Assumption 2. This proves the result.
37Table 1
The state space
Weak Redistributive Common interest
Peace low ￿;￿;R
high ￿
low ￿;R high ￿, ￿
Repression
low ￿;￿;￿;R
high ￿
low ￿;￿;R
high ￿;￿ n/a
Civil war
low ￿;￿;￿
high ￿;R
low ￿;￿;￿
high ￿;R n/a
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